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Abstract
Logic-based approaches to AI have the advantage that their behaviour can in principle
be explained by providing their users with proofs for the derived consequences. However,
if such proofs get very large, then it may be hard to understand a consequence even if the
individual derivation steps are easy to comprehend. This motivates our interest in finding
small proofs for Description Logic (DL) entailments. Instead of concentrating on a specific
DL and proof calculus for this DL, we introduce a general framework in which proofs are
represented as labeled, directed hypergraphs, where each hyperedge corresponds to a single
sound derivation step. On the theoretical side, we investigate the complexity of deciding
whether a certain consequence has a proof of size at most n along the following orthogonal
dimensions: (i) the underlying proof system is polynomial or exponential; (ii) proofs may
or may not reuse already derived consequences; and (iii) the number n is represented in
unary or binary. We have determined the exact worst-case complexity of this decision
problem for all but one of the possible combinations of these options. On the practical
side, we have developed and implemented an approach for generating proofs for expressive
DLs based on a non-standard reasoning task called forgetting. We have evaluated this
approach on a set of realistic ontologies and compared the obtained proofs with proofs
generated by the DL reasoner ELK, finding that forgetting-based proofs are often better
w.r.t. different measures of proof complexity.
1 Introduction
Embedded or cyber-physical systems that interact autonomously with the real world, or with
users they are supposed to support, must continuously make decisions based on sensor data,
user input, knowledge they have acquired during runtime as well as knowledge provided during
design-time. To make the behavior of such systems comprehensible, they need to be able to
explain their decisions to the user or, after something has gone wrong, to an accident investiga-
tor. While systems that use Machine Learning (ML) to interpret sensor data are very fast and
usually quite accurate, their decisions are notoriously hard to explain, though huge efforts are
currently being made to overcome this problem [1]. In contrast, decisions made by reasoning
about symbolically represented knowledge are in principle easy to explain. In particular, if the
knowledge is represented in (some fragment of) first-order (FO) logic, and a decision is made
based on the result of an FO reasoning process, then one can in principle use a formal proof in
an appropriate calculus to explain an entailment. In practice, however, things are not so rosy
also in the symbolic setting. On the one hand, proofs may be very large, and thus it may be hard
to comprehend why the overall entailment holds even if each single derivation step is easy to
follow. On the other hand, single proof steps may also be hard to understand, in particular for
users that are not experts in logic. The problem of explaining why a certain consequence follows
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from a given set of sentences has been considered for full FO automated theorem proving since
at least four decades. Since the resolution proofs generated by high-performance automated
theorem provers are not appropriate for human consumption, approaches transforming them
into proofs in more human-oriented calculi (such as Gentzen’s natural deduction calculus [29])
have been developed. To alleviate the tedious task of following a huge number of these steps,
abstractions of proofs that use definitions, lemmas, and more abstract deduction rules have
been investigated [21]. A more detailed description of the huge body of research in this area is
beyond the scope of this paper.
Here we concentrate on explaining the results of DL reasoning using formal proofs, and
in particular on how complex it is to find small proofs. The first work on explaining DL
entailments is probably the PhD thesis of McGuinness [31], where the results obtained by the
structural subsumption algorithm of the CLASSIC system [11] are translated into proofs in
a formal calculus. The thesis also investigates how to create shorter, better understandable
proofs by pruning away unimportant parts. In [10], proofs of subsumptions generated by a
tableau-based system are translated into sequent proofs. The authors then investigate how to
make the sequent proofs shorter. More recent work on explaining DL entailment was often
focused on computing so-called justifications, i.e., minimal subsets of the knowledge base (KB)
from which the consequence in question follows (see, e.g., [7, 18, 38]). The basic assumption is
here that, whereas KBs may be very large and have many consequences, a single consequence
often follows from a small subset of the KB by an easy derivation. While this is true in
certain applications [9], in general it may be quite hard for a user to see without help why
a consequence follows from a given justification [20]. On the one hand, this has triggered
research into assessing the complexity of a justification, i.e., how hard it is to derive the given
consequence from the justification [19, 32]. On the other hand, it has rekindled the interest in
generating proofs appropriate for human consumption. For example, the explanation plugin
for the ontology editor Protégé described in [24] cannot only produce justfications, but can
also display proofs, provided that proofs of an appropriate form are returned by the employed
reasoner, an assumption that is, e.g., satisfied by the reasoner ELK [25]. While these proofs
are represented in the formal syntax employed by Protégé, the work reported in [32,36,37] uses
ontology verbalization techniques to translate proofs into natural language text.
Since most of the previous work on generating proofs for DL entailments emphasizes the
importance of small proofs, we investigate in this paper how hard it is to find such proofs.
Instead of concentrating on a specific DL and proof calculus or reasoner for this DL, we introduce
a general framework in which proofs are represented as labeled, directed hypergraphs whose
hyperedges correspond to single sound derivation steps. To be more precise, we assume that
a reasoner (called deriver in this paper, to distinguish it from an actual implemented system)
generates a so-called derivation structure, which consists of possible proof steps, from which
actual proofs can be derived. For example, if we consider the consequence-based reasoning
approaches for the DLs EL and ELI described in [5], then a derivation structure for a given
KB and consequence consists of the (finitely many) instantiated classification rules. The EL
reasoner ELK actually returns such a derivation structure, but this structure only contains the
rule instances that have actually been used during the reasoning process.
On the theoretical side, we investigate the complexity of deciding whether a certain conse-
quence has a proof of size at most n along three orthogonal dimensions. First, we distinguish
between derivers that produce derivation structures of polynomial or exponential size. For ex-
ample, there is a polynomial deriver for EL (e.g., the one implemented by ELK), whereas ELI
has an exponential, but no polynomial deriver. Second, we distinguish between arbitrary proofs
and tree-shaped proofs, which may not reuse already derived consequences, but must re-derive
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them each time they are needed. Finally, we distinguish between unary and binary coding of
the number n, which bounds the size of the proof. Tables summarizing the complexity results
shown in this paper can be found in Section 4 (Table 1 and 2). We see that, for general proofs,
the above decision problem is NP-complete even for polynomial derivers and unary coding of
numbers. For exponential derivers, the complexity depends on the coding of the number n: it
is NP-complete for unary coding, but NExpTime-complete for binary coding. Interestingly, for
tree-shaped proofs the complexity is considerably lower, which is due to the fact that we can
use a Dijkstra-like greedy algorithm to compute minimal tree-shaped proofs.
On the practical side, we compare the time it requires to extract a smallest proof vs. a
smallest tree-shaped proof from derivation structures extracted from ELK, and our findings
match the theoretical complexity results, i.e., finding small tree-shaped proofs is easier. More-
over, we have developed and implemented an approach for generating proofs for expressive DLs
based on forgetting [26, 30]. We have evaluated this approach on a set of realistic ontologies
and compared the proofs obtained using the forgetting tools LETHE [27] and FAME [41] with
proofs generated by the DL reasoner ELK, finding that forgetting-based proofs are often better
w.r.t. different measures of proof complexity. In addition to measuring the size of proofs, we
also consider measures obtained by applying the justification complexity measure of [19] to the
proof steps.
This technical report extends the original paper by two appendices. Appendix A (“Theory”)
contains the missing proofs from the main part of this paper, while Appendix B (“Practice”)
provides additional examples of automatically generated proofs.
2 Preliminaries
Most of our theoretical discussion applies to arbitrary logics L = (SL, |=L), which consist of
a set SL of L-sentences and a consequence relation |=L ⊆ P (SL) × SL between L-theories,
i.e., subsets of L-sentences, and single L-sentences. We assume that |=L has a model-based
definition, i.e., for some definition of “model”, T |=L α holds iff every model of all elements
in T is also a model of α. We also assume that the size |α| of an L-sentence α is defined in
some way, e.g. by the number of symbols in α. Since L is usually fixed, we drop the prefix “L-”
from now on. For example, L could be first-order logic. However, we are mainly interested in
proofs for DLs, which can be seen as decidable fragments of first-order logic [4]. In particular,
we use specific DLs to show our hardness results.
The syntax of DLs is based on disjoint, countably infinite sets NC and NR of concept
names A,B, . . . and role names r, s, . . . , respectively. Sentences of the DL EL, called gen-
eral concept inclusions (GCIs), are of the form C v D, where C and D are EL-concepts, which
are built from concept names by applying the constructors > (top), C uD (conjunction), and
∃r.C (existential restriction for a role name r). The DL ALC extends EL by the constructors
⊥ (bottom), C unionsq D (disjunction), ∀r.C (value restriction), and ¬C (negation). Both EL and
ALC can be extended by a new kind of sentences r v s, called role inclusions, where r and s
are role names, and by additional constructors such as nominals or inverse roles. These exten-
sions are denoted by the additional letters H, O, and I, respectively, appended to the name of
the logic, resulting in DLs such as ALCH, ALCOI or ELI. In DLs, finite theories are called
TBoxes or ontologies. We use sig(X) to denote the signature of some ontology or sentence X,
i.e., the set of concept and role names occurring in X.
The semantics of DLs is based on first-order interpretations; for details, see [4]. In Fig-
ure 1, we depict a simplified version of the inference rules for EL from [25]. For example,
{A v ∃r.B, B v C, ∃r.C v D} |= A v D is a valid inference in EL. Deciding consequences in
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R0 C v C R> C v >
C v D D v ERv
C v E
C v D u ER−u,1 C v D
C v D u ER−u,2 C v E
C v D C v ER+u C v D u E
C v ∃r.D D v ER∃ C v ∃r.E
Figure 1: The inference rules for EL used in Elk.
A v B
B v B B v ∃r.A
B v B u ∃r.A
A v B u ∃r.A
Figure 2: A tree-shaped proof in EL
EL is P-complete [2], and in ELI and ALC it is ExpTime-complete [3, 35]. Given a TBox T
and sentence α, a justification for α in T is a minimal subset J ⊆ T such that J |= α. Al-
ready for EL-ontologies, finding a single justification is possible in polynomial time, but there
may be exponentially many justifications, and furthermore finding a justification of size ≤ n is
NP-complete [8].
3 Proofs, Derivers and Derivation Structures
While justifications are a popular tool for pinpointing the reasons for an entailment in an
ontology, they do not provide deeper information on the reasoning behind the entailment. In
contrast, consequence-based reasoners such as Cel [6] and Elk [25] derive new consequences
using a fixed set of inference rules, and hence could provide proofs like in Figure 2, which
uses the inference rules from Figure 1. Of course, the precise structure of a proof depends
on the inference rules that are allowed to draw conclusions. Moreover, provers usually output
a consequence only once, even if it is used in several inference steps. To be able to study
abstract properties of such proofs, we view proofs as directed hypergraphs, in which hyperedges
represent inference steps that connect a set of sentences (the premises) to another sentence (the
conclusion). In the following, we fix a logic L.
Definition 1 (Hypergraph). A (directed, labelled) hypergraph [33] is a triple H = (V,E, `),
where
• V is a finite set of vertices,
• E is a set of hyperedges (S, d), where S ⊆ V and d ∈ V , and
• ` : V → SL is a labelling function that assigns sentences to vertices.
The size of H, denoted |H|, is measured by the size of the labels of its hyperedges:
|H| :=
∑
(S,d)∈E
(
|`(d)|+
∑
v∈S
|`(v)|
)
.
A vertex v ∈ V is called a leaf if it has no incoming hyperedges, i.e., there is no (S, v) ∈ E, and
v is a sink if it has no outgoing hyperedges, i.e., there is no (S, d) ∈ E such that v ∈ S.
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B v ∃r.AB v B
B v B u ∃r.AA v B
A v B u ∃r.A
Figure 3: A derivation structure (which is a proof)
A v ∃r.AA v B
A v B u ∃r.A
Figure 4: A cyclic derivation structure
Definition 2 (Derivation Structure). A derivation structure D = (V,E, `) over a finite the-
ory T is a hypergraph, where
• D is grounded, i.e., every leaf v in D is labeled by `(v) ∈ T ; and
• D is sound, i.e., for every (S, d) ∈ E, the entailment {`(s) | s ∈ S} |= `(d) holds.
A derivation structure D′ = (V ′, E′, `′) is called a substructure of D = (V,E, `) if V ′ ⊆ V ,
E′ ⊆ E and `′ = `|V ′ . In this case, we also say that D contains D′.
In such a structure, the hyperedges are called inference steps. There can be inference steps
of the form (∅, v) if v is labeled by a tautology, for example in Figure 3, where the leafs are
marked with a thick border and labeled by the EL sentences from T = {A v B,B v ∃r.A} and
the hyperedges represent valid EL entailments, in particular ∅ |= {B v B}. This hypergraph
correponds to the tree-shaped proof in Figure 2. On the other hand, Figure 4 depicts a derivation
structure that does not correspond to a proof since it contains cyclic inferences.
Definition 3 (Cycle, Tree). Given a hypergraph H = (V,E, `) and s, t ∈ V , a path P of length
q in H from s to t is a sequence of vertices and hyperedges
P = (d0, (S1, d1), d1, (S2, d2), . . . , dq−1, (Sq, dq), dq),
where d0 = s, dq = t, and dj−1 ∈ Sj for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ q. If there is such a path in H, we say
that t is reachable from s in H. If t = s, then P is called a cycle. A hypergraph is acyclic if it
does not contain a cycle.
A tree H = (V,E, `) with root t ∈ V is a hypergraph in which t is a sink and is reachable
from every vertex v ∈ V \ {t} by exactly one path.
In particular, the root is the only sink in a tree, and all trees are acyclic. We can now define
proofs as special derivation structures that derive a goal sentence.
Definition 4 (Proof). Given a sentence η and a finite theory T , a proof for T |= η is a
derivation structure P = (V,E, `) over T that
• contains exactly one sink vη ∈ V , which is labelled by η, and
• is acyclic.
A tree proof is a proof that is a tree.
For example, the derivation structure in Figure 3 is a proof according to this definition, but
the one in Figure 4 is not. Figures 5 and 6 depict two more ways to prove A v B u ∃r.A from
T = {A v B, B v ∃r.A} (following the inference rules in Figure 1). The first is presented in
classical notation as a tree and the second one as a hypergraph without sentence label repetition.
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A v B
A v B B v ∃r.A
A v ∃r.A
A v B u ∃r.A
Figure 5: A tree-shaped proof
B v ∃r.AA v B
A v ∃r.A
A v B u ∃r.A
Figure 6: A proof with a reused vertex
Both of them can be seen as proofs in the sense of Definition 4 and they use the same inference
steps, but have different numbers of vertices.
To compare these different kinds of proofs, we recall the notion of homomorphism.
Definition 5 (Homomorphism). Let H = (V,E, `) and H ′ = (V ′, E′, `′) be two hypergraphs.
A homomorphism from H to H ′, denoted h : H → H ′, is a mapping h : V → V ′ such that for
all (S, d) ∈ E, one has h(S, d) := ({h(v) | v ∈ S}, h(d)) ∈ E′ and, for all v ∈ V , it holds that
`′(h(v)) = `(v). The homomorphism h is an isomorphism if it is a bijection and, for all S ⊆ V
and d ∈ V , we have (S, d) ∈ E iff h(S, d) ∈ E′.
Recall that our goal is to find, among all possible proofs of a sentence using a specific set
of inference rules, a “minimal” one. Before we define what exactly we mean by “minimal,” we
first need to specify what “all possible proofs” means. For this, we assume that we are given
a deriver (e.g. a first-order theorem prover or a DL reasoner) that, given a theory T and a
goal sentence η, produces a derivation structure D. This structure describes all instances of
inference rules that are relevant for constructing proofs for η, without us having to know the
details of these rules. The quest for a minimal proof thus becomes a search for a minimal proof
expressible by the inference steps in D. Since systems of inference rules may not be complete
for proving arbitrary sentences of a given logic L, we restrict η in the following definition to
a subset CL ⊆ SL of allowed consequences. For example, in DLs a common reasoning task
is classification, which amounts to checking entailment of atomic concept subsumptions of the
form A v B, where A and B are concept names.
Definition 6 (Deriver). A deriver D is given by a set CL ⊆ SL and a function that assigns
derivation structures to pairs (T , η) of finite theories T ⊆ SL and sentences η ∈ CL, such that
T |= η iff D(T , η) contains a proof for T |= η. A proof P for T |= η is called admissible w.r.t.
D(T , η) if there is a homomorphism h : P → D(T , η).
We call D a polynomial deriver if there exists a polynomial p(x) such that the size of
D(T , η) is bounded by p(|T |+ |η|). Exponential derivers are defined similarly by the restriction
|D(T , η)| ≤ 2p(|T |+|η|).
Elk [25] can be seen as a polynomial deriver for EL in this sense, because it allows to
instantiate the inference rules in Figure 1 with only a polynomial number of EL-concepts,
namely the subconcepts appearing in T or η. The derivation structure Elk(T , η) thus contains
all allowed instances of these rules, where each sentence is represented by a unique vertex.
Since the number of premises in each rule is bounded by 2, the overall size of this structure
is polynomial. Elk is complete only for some goal sentences of the form C v D, where D
is a concept name and C is a subconcept from T .1 An example of an exponential deriver
is given by the inference rules for ALC [39], which are complete for entailments of the form
T |= M v ⊥, where T is normalized (see [39] for details) and M is a conjunction of literals
1To prove other kinds of entailments T |= η, one first has to normalize T and η [2].
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B v ∃r.AA v B
A v B u ∃r.A
Figure 7: A justification proof
(concept names or negated concept names). For each such T andM , it is guaranteed that there
are only exponentially many valid inference steps. Other examples include a triple-exponential
inference system for the very expressive DL ALCHOIQ [12] and an exponential deriver for
ELI [5]. For a survey on consequence-based reasoning in DLs, see [13].
Note that the generality of our definitions also admits proofs as in Figure 7, where the
consequence is derived directly from its justification in one inference step. Indeed, such a short
proof can sometimes be the most effective explanation. In this paper, we leave the choice of
which granularity of inference steps is most appropriate to the chosen deriver.
4 The Complexity of Finding Minimal Proofs
We focus on two kinds of proof representations (cf. Figures 5 and 6). In Section 4.2, we consider
tree-shaped proofs in the classical form that is naturally suited for a two-dimensional layout.
However, by allowing an arbitrary hypergraphs as in Section 4.1, one may obtain more concise
proofs. This is closer to the usual output of an automated inference system, which reports each
derived consequence only once. These two approaches have important differences which result
in different complexity bounds for the problem of finding a minimal proof. Due to lack of space,
we include only proof sketches and defer the complete proofs to the appendix.
4.1 Minimal Proofs
We formally define our main problem: finding minimal admissible proofs w.r.t. D(T , η). We
consider a proof minimal if it has a minimal number of vertices. Given a proof P = (V,E, `),
we define vert(P) := |V | for any proof P = (V,E, `).
Definition 7 (Minimal Proof). Let D be a deriver. Given a theory T and a sentence η ∈ CL, an
admissible proof P w.r.t. D(T , η) is called minimal if vert(P) is minimal among all such proofs.
The associated decision problem, denoted MP(D), is to decide, given T and η as above and a
natural number n ∈ N, whether there is an admissible proof P w.r.t. D(T , η) with vert(P) ≤ n.
If D is a polynomial deriver, we add the superscript poly to MP, in case of an exponential
deriver we add exp. If n is encoded in unary representation, we add a subscript unary, and for
binary encoding binary, e.g. MPpolyunary(D).
Note that an admissible proof P has no less vertices than its homomorphic image in D(T , η).
We can show that if P is minimal, then this image must be isomorphic to P, and therefore is
also a proof. Thus, to decide MP(D) we can focus on proofs which are substructures of D(T , η).
Lemma 8. There exists a substructure in D(T , η) which is a minimal proof.
Our complexity results for MP(D) are summarized in Table 1.
To show the upper bounds for the second row of the table, we can simply guess a substruc-
ture P of D(T , η) and check the conditions of Definitions 2 and 4 and that vert(P) ≤ n.
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Table 1: The complexity of MP(D).
poly exp
unary NP [Th. 11] NP [Th. 10]
binary NP [Th. 9] NExpTime [Th. 9, Th. 12]
Table 2: The complexity of MTP(D).
poly exp
unary P [Th. 17] NP [Th. 18, Th. 19]
binary P [Th. 16] ≤ ExpTime [Th. 16]
Theorem 9. MPpolybinary(D) is in NP and MP
exp
binary(D) is in NExpTime.
For the case of MPexpunary(D), we can show an NP-upper bound if we make some additional
(reasonable) assumptions. In practice, in order to search for a proof of polynomially bounded
size, it does not make sense to construct a complete derivation structure of exponential size
first. Instead, a reasoning system would request relevant parts of the derivation structure on
demand, for instance guided by a calculus. As a simple abstraction of this, for our complexity
upper bounds, we assume that we can access derivation structures by means of oracle functions
that can instantly check whether a given pair (S, d) is a hyperedge in D(T , η), and whether a
given vertex has a certain label.2
Theorem 10. MPexpunary(D) is in NP.
The NP-hardness of MPpolyunary(D) can be shown by a reduction of the hitting set problem [16]
using Elk with the inference rules in Figure 1 as a polynomial deriver. The hardness argument
is inspired by a similar result for justifications in [8].
Theorem 11. There is a polynomial deriver D such that MPpolyunary(D) is NP-hard.
It remains to show one lower bound for Table 1. For MPexpbinary(D), we can use the deriver
given by the calculus for ELI from [5], and perform a reduction from a NExpTime-hard tiling
problem. While the reduction is relatively complex, the main idea can be briefly sketched as
follows: we use the sentences in the derivation structure to refer to possible combinations of
coordinates in the tiling with associated tile types, where two roles are used to refer to possible
neighbours. The entailment to be proven requires to infer at least the sentences in a possible
tiling. The bound on the size of the proof makes sure that the same coordinates cannot be used
twice, thus identifying coordinates with tile types. A special challenge arises from the fact that
even auxiliary sentences and inferences contribute to the proof size, which should not depend
on specifics of the tiling solutions such as whether all tiling conditions are used or not.
Theorem 12. There is an exponential deriver D such that MPexpbinary(D) is NExpTime-hard.
4.2 Minimal Tree Proofs
We now introduce a variant of MP(D) that considers tree-shaped proofs.
Definition 13 (Minimal Tree Proof). Let D be a deriver. Given a theory T and a sen-
tence η ∈ CL such that T |= η, an admissible tree proof w.r.t. D(T , η) is called minimal if
vert(P) is minimal among all such tree proofs. We use MTP(D) analogously to MP(D).
Table 2 summarizes our results regarding MTP(D). Surprisingly, for polynomial derivers
the complexity drops from NP to P when allowing only tree proofs. The reason is that we
can use a greedy, Dijkstra-like algorithm [15, 33] to find a minimal tree proof. The original
algorithm is designed to find shortest hyperpaths, which are defined as follows [33].
2This is similar to how a random-access Turing machine can access its input tape by specifying cell addresses.
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Definition 14 (Hyperpath). Given two vertices s and t, a hyperpath Π is an acyclic hypergraph
Π = (V,E, `) such that:
• s, t ∈ V ,
• for any v ∈ V \ {s}, v is reachable from s in Π, and
• there exists no proper substructure of Π with the above properties.
The second condition implies that for each v ∈ V \{s} there is an incoming hyperedge (S, v)
in Π, while the third implies that hyperedge (S, v) is unique, i.e., there is no other incoming
hyperedge for v.
Given a derivation structure D = (V,E, `) over a theory T , we define D∗ = (V ∪{s}, E∗, `∗)
by extending D with an auxiliary vertex s, whose label is arbitrary, and new edges connecting
s to every vertex labelled by a tautology or an element of T :
E∗ = E ∪ {({s}, v) | v ∈ V, `(v) ∈ T } ∪ {({s}, v) | (∅, v) ∈ E}.
Intuitively, proofs for T |= η in D correspond to hyperpaths in D∗ that connect s to a
target vertex t labeled by η, and tree proofs correspond to the unraveling of such hyperpaths.3
However, we also need to be able to measure the size of a tree proof based on the corresponding
hyperpath. The algorithm from [15] finds a hyperpath P = (V,E, `) in D∗ from s to t that is
minimal w.r.t. a so-called additive weighting function.4 We are here interested in the following
such function:
WP(s) := 0, for the source vertex s,
WP(d) := 1 +
∑
v∈S
WP(v), for every (S, d) ∈ E,
WP(P) := WP(t), for the target vertex t.
This is well-defined since a hyperpath can contain no cycles and exactly one incoming edge
for each vertex except s. Intuitively, additive weighting functions (corresponding to minimal
tree proofs) do not need to keep track of whether a particular vertex/sentence has already
been visited before, but simply add a value—in our case 1—whenever the vertex is visited.
In other words, admissible tree proofs can use multiple copies of vertices from the derivation
structure D(T , η). In contrast, for minimal proofs in general (corresponding to special non-
additive weighting functions) one has to keep track of which vertices/sentences have already
been visited, in order to avoid counting them twice.
Lemma 15. There is a tree proof P for T |= η that is admissible w.r.t. D = D(T , η) with
vert(P) ≤ m iff D∗ contains a hyperpath P ′ from s to a vertex t labeled with η withWP′(P ′) ≤ m.
Hence, the polynomial algorithm SBT-Dijkstra from [15] can be used to find minimal tree
proofs in polynomial time in the size of the derivation structure D(T , η).
Theorem 16. MTPpolybinary(D) is in P and MTP
exp
binary(D) is in ExpTime.
3Similar to graph theory, by the unraveling (unfolding) of a hypergraph we mean a (subset-)minimal tree
hypergraph obtained from the original hypergraph by copying vertices, such that for each path in the original
hypergraph there is a corresponding path, up to copies, in the unraveled hypergraph.
4In the case of non-additive functions, [22] have proved that the problem of finding minimal hyperpaths is
NP-hard, which is analogous to the result in Theorem 11.
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For the matching lower bound for MTPpolyunary(D), we reduce the P-hard entailment problem
in EL without existential restrictions [14] to MTP(D), where D is Elk. The challenge here
is to show that minimal tree proofs admissible w.r.t. this derivation structure are bounded
polynomially (which trivially holds in the case of MP(Elk)). For that we propose a strategy
for applying the inference from Figure 1 (omitting existential restrictions) which demonstrates
that there is no superpolynomially large minimal tree proof admissible w.r.t. the deriver.
Theorem 17. There exists a polynomial deriver D such that MTPpolyunary(D) is P-hard under
LogSpace-reductions.
Regarding the lower bound for MTPexpunary(D), we again use the exponential deriver for ELI
from [5], and this time use it for a reduction of SAT. Different to the lower bounds in the last
subsection, we cannot use the number of vertices to restrict the usage of sentences throughout
the whole proof: the special property of tree proofs is that sub-trees cannot be shared among
different parts of the proof. The solution is to build the TBox in such a way that minimal
proofs are mostly linear. For SAT, we need to simulate the “guessing” of a valuation for the
SAT formula, which is then checked against the different clauses of the input formula. The
intuitive idea is to collect the truth values in a single concept using a linear sequence of rule
applications, and use another linear sequence to check this concept against each clause one after
the other. The number of vertices is used to restrict the non-deterministic choices in the proof,
and allows us to enforce that, for each variable, only one valuation is picked.
Theorem 18. There is an exponential deriver D such that MTPexpunary(D) is NP-hard.
The remaining NP upper bound for Table 2 can be shown analogously to Theorem 10.
Theorem 19. MTPexpunary(D) is in NP.
5 Finding Proofs in Practice
To analyze the practical aspects of finding minimal proofs, we ran several experiments for
reasoning tasks in description logics.5 We first extracted a dataset containing explanation tasks
from the ontologies of the OWL 2 EL classification track of the 2015 OWL Reasoner Evaluation
(ORE) [34]. Due to the second experiment described below, we filtered out all sentences that
are not expressible in ELH. To avoid re-evaluating proofs that are the same modulo renaming
of concept and role names, we extracted a set of justification patterns. Specifically, we used
Elk to compute all justifications J of entailments α of the form A v B or A ≡ B in the filtered
ontologies, and identified those that are the same modulo renaming, resulting in a set of 1573
unique entailments J |= α (up to renaming of concept and role names).6
5.1 Minimal Proofs vs. Minimal Tree Proofs
Internally, Elk generates a derivation structure that contains all possible proofs of a given
entailment, possibly even including cycles. Elk 0.5 provides an explanation service that can be
used for directly accessing the proof steps [23, 24]: specifically, for a given entailment C v D,
5The datasets and scripts used for the experiments can be found at https://lat.inf.tu-dresden.de/
2020-finding-small-proofs .
6For 4 ontologies the generation of justifications caused an OutOfMemoryError (using Java OpenJDK 11.0.4
with a maximum heap size of 23.5GB), hence any unique ELH entailments from these ontologies are not part
of our dataset.
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Figure 8: Times for extracting minimal (tree) proofs (in ms). Each dot represents one expla-
nation task.
it allows to request all rule applications performed by Elk that produce C v D. Recursive
requests of this kind allow to reconstruct the entire derivation structures generated by Elk.
We used these derivation structures for our purposes to analyze the difference between MP
and MTP in practice. We implemented the Dijkstra-based algorithm for extracting minimal
tree proofs, and a brute-force recursive procedure for finding minimal (non-tree) proofs. The
resulting runtimes for the 1573 explanation tasks are compared in Figure 8. One can see that
extracting trees was generally slower, but gained an advantage for larger derivation structures.
This is probably due to the overhead of the various data structures required for the Dijkstra
algorithm, the implementation of which was not optimized very far.
This gives experimental evidence of the difference in complexity of these two tasks observed
in the previous section. More surprisingly, however, it turns out that both methods always
yielded equivalent results, i.e., for our dataset the minimal tree proof is always the unraveling
of the minimal (non-tree) proof. Although in theory there can be a difference between the two,
this does not seem to be relevant in practice, at least not in our dataset.
5.2 Forgetting-Based Proofs
Since finding a proof with a minimal number of vertices is NP-hard, we now leave the goal
of optimality aside and simply compare proofs generated by different techniques using differ-
ent metrics. Since there exist only few implementations of consequence-based algorithms for
description logics that are able to produce proofs (Elk [24, 25] being the notable exception),
we developed a black-box approach to generate proofs that are not based on a set of inference
rules.
The main idea for this approach comes from the observation that the premises of a proof
usually contain more symbols than the conclusion. For example, in the proof A v C C v B
A v B the
concept name C is eliminated by the inference step. Hence, the problem of finding a proof looks
like a forgetting problem [28,30], where the symbols that do not occur in the conclusion should
be removed. In the example, {A v B} can be seen as the result of forgetting C in the original
TBox {A v C, C v B}. More generally, a forgetting-based proof is composed of multiple steps
that correspond to forgetting single symbols.
Definition 20. Given a TBox T and a concept or role name X, the result of forgetting X
in T is another TBox T ′ such that sig(T ′) ⊆ sig(T ) \ {X} and for any sentence η with
sig(η) ⊆ sig(T ) \ {X} we have T ′ |= η iff T |= η.
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A v C
C v ∃r.D(D)
C v ∃r.>(C)
A v ∃r.> ∃r.> v B(r)
A v B
Figure 9: A proof obtained by FBA
A v C
C v ∃r.D ∃r.> v B(r)
C v B(C)
A v B
Figure 10: An alternative proof
The result of forgetting might not always exist in typical description logics, and require the
use of additional constructs such as fixpoint operators [28,30,41].
Our forgetting-based approach (FBA) for constructing proofs can be summarized as follows.
Given a TBox T and a sentence η that is of the form A v B or A ≡ B, the goal is to forget all
symbols except A and B from T . Since rarely the whole TBox is needed for a proof, we first
extract a justification J ⊆ T for η, which already fixes the premises of the final proof. We then
construct a sequence of TBoxes T0, T1, . . . , Tn, where T0 = J and each Ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is the
result of forgetting one symbol from Ti−1 (except A or B), and then extracting a justification
for η. This process finishes when sig(Tn) ⊆ {A,B}. If one forgetting step fails, we try to forget
a different symbol instead. If this fails for all symbols in the current signature, the process
terminates early and we set Tn := {η}.
To reconstruct the actual proof from these TBoxes, we start with a vertex labeled with η and
select a justification Jη for η in Tn−1, which gives us a first proof step that derives η from Jη.
We add a new vertex for each element of Jη, and a hyperedge connecting these vertices to the
sink. We then recursively justify each element of Jη in Tn−2, and continue in this manner until
we reach the sentences from the original TBox in T0 = J ⊆ T . Each justification step for an
intermediate sentence then corresponds to one inference step in the proof, which can be further
annotated by the symbol that was forgotten in the corresponding forgetting operation.
Example 1. We start with T0 = {C v ∃r.D, A v C, ∃r.> v B} and want to prove that
T0 |= A v B. We first forget the symbol D, resulting in T1 = {C v ∃r.>, A v C, ∃r.> v B},
then C, which yields T2 = {A v ∃r.>, ∃r.> v B}. Finally, forgetting r obtains T3 = {A v B};
see Figure 9. The premises of e.g. A v ∃r.> in T2 are a justification of this sentence in T1.
Note that the precise result of FBA depends on the choices of justifications in each step as
well as the order in which symbols are forgotten.
Example 2. First forgetting r in T0 from Example 1 would result in T1 = {A v C, C v B}
and a different proof in Figure 10.
However, regardless of these choices, FBA is sound and complete.
Theorem 21. Let FBA use a sound and complete reasoner to compute justifications and a
sound forgetting tool. Given a sentence η and a TBox T , FBA produces a proof P iff T |= η.
The main advantage of this approach is that it works in a black-box fashion, using any
forgetting tool and reasoner to compute justifications (as long as they support L). This means
that we can find proofs for inferences in expressive logics like ALCH or ALCOI, for which
no consequence-based proof generators exist, using forgetting tools such as Lethe [27] and
Fame [41]. FBA also does not explicitly generate tautologies, as many consequence-based
reasoners do, cutting down on the size of proofs, but possibly making them harder to follow.
An obvious disadvantage compared to consequence-based reasoners is the lack of a predefined
set of inference rules, requiring more effort to understand each individual inference step.
12
Small Proofs for DL Entailments Alrabbaa, Baader, Borgwardt, Koopmann, Kovtunova
A v C C v ∃r.D(C)
A v ∃r.> ∃r.> v B(r)
A v B
Figure 11: A more compact proof for Example 1
5.3 Optimizations for FBA
When actually implementing FBA, we considered several refinements of this method. First, it
may be the case that the justification Jα for α ∈ Ti in Ti−1 may be exactly {α}, because α does
not contain the symbol that was forgotten in this step. In such a case, we skip the corresponding
trivial inference step αα , and instead use a justification for α from the first TBox Tj , j < i, such
that α /∈ Tj . We further extended this optimization: if the justification of a sentence α ∈ Ti
in Ti−2 does not contain more sentences than the justification in Ti−1, we choose the premises
from the “earlier” TBox Ti−2 to skip “simple” steps involving only one sentence. In Example 1,
the justification {A v C, C v ∃r.D} for A v ∃r.> in T0 would be preferred to the justification
of the same size in T1, resulting in the more compact proof – see Figure 11.
Regarding the order in which symbols are forgotten, we considered several aspects. Once a
role name is forgotten, all proof steps that concern the fillers of existential or value restrictions
over this role are hidden from the proof. This is problematic if most proof steps take place
“within” a role restriction, which is why role names should be forgotten as late as possible to
make the proofs as fine-grained as possible. On the other hand, once a role r does not have non-
trivial fillers anymore, i.e., only occurs in expressions like ∃r.> or ∀r.⊥, we should immediately
forget it, to focus on the remaining parts of the sentence instead of keeping ∃r.> around in all
intermediate steps. More precisely, the priority with which we try to forget symbols in each
step is the following: first role names without non-trivial fillers, then concept names that do
not occur nested within existential or value restrictions, then any other concept names, and
finally the remaining role names.
5.4 Evaluating FBA
In our second experiment, we compared the minimal proofs extracted from Elk with the
ones from our forgetting-based approach, using both Lethe [27] and Fame [41] as black-box
forgetters7 (and HermiT [17] as reasoner). Of Lethe, we used the latest version 0.6,8 and
for Fame, we used the ALCOI-variant of Fame 1.0,9 since other versions often fail to produce
forgetting results that can be handled by the OWL API. Apart from the supported DL, a major
difference between Lethe and Fame is that Lethe is theoretically guaranteed to compute a
sound and complete forgetting result, while Fame is incomplete and may fail to forget a given
name. Note that Lethe supports ALCH and Fame supports ALCOI, but we only consider
ELH reasoning tasks since we want to compare with Elk.
To demonstrate the output of the proof generators, in Figure 12 we provide two alternative
proofs, one generated by Elk and the other by FBA. The automatically generated images
use blue boxes to denote hyperedges (S, d), with incoming and outgoing arrows indicating S
and d, respectively, and a label indicating the type of inference rule (for Elk) or the forgotten
7Both Lethe and Fame may generate fixpoint expressions that are not expressible in usual DLs. We omit
any such steps from the generated proofs.
8https://lat.inf.tu-dresden.de/~koopmann/LETHE
9http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~schmidt/sf-fame
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Figure 12: The Elk proof (left) makes several inference steps, which are summarized by Lethe
and Fame (right) into a single step.
symbol(s) (for FBA). In contrast to our previous definition of hypergraphs, both Elk and our
implementation of FBA treat sentences from the TBox not as leaves, but as being derived by
a special kind of hyperedges (∅, v) labeled by “asserted” or “Asserted Conclusion”.
We generated such proofs for each explanation task from our dataset using the 3 tools and
compared these proofs according to different metrics. In Figure 13 we compare the hypergraph
size (number of vertices) and tree size (number of vertices of the unraveling) of the generated
proofs, where each dot may represent multiple entailments J |= α. Fame did not generate
proofs for 656 of the 1573 tasks, which are assigned a score of 0 in all diagrams (290 contained
role inclusions, which are not supported by the version of Fame that we used, and in 366
cases it returned an incorrect forgetting result10). In contrast, Lethe is complete for ALCH
forgetting and always yields a proof using the preferred order of forgetting symbols. We can see
that most of the forgetting-based proofs were of similar size or smaller than the corresponding
ones generated by Elk. However, recall that the proofs generated using Lethe and Fame have
the advantage that they can use inference steps in more expressive logics than ELH, which may
result in more compact proofs. Moreover, the proofs generated using Fame were usually larger
than the ones from Lethe, which can be explained by additional simplification steps performed
by Lethe when computing the forgetting result [27].
Next we wanted to find out how hard it would be for a user to actually understand the
generated proofs. This is hard to evaluate empirically, but was already attempted for plain
justifications [19], resulting in a justification complexity model that assigns a numerical score
to an entailment task J |= α, indicating its difficulty. We evaluated all individual inference
steps in the generated proofs according to this model and report in Figure 14 the sum and
the maximum of the justification complexities of all inference steps in each proof. Here, the
advantage of the forgetting-based approach over Elk was less pronounced. Although the sum of
justification complexities is correlated with the hypergraph size, the difficulty of the individual
steps now also plays a role. For maximum justification complexity, Lethe scored worse than
10As this points at a bug in the tool that might not have been detected before, we have informed the developer.
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Figure 13: Comparison of the tree size and hypergraph size of the proofs generated by the three
tools. In parentheses are the numbers of entries that lie strictly above or below the diagonals
(excluding cases where one of the tools did not produce a proof at all, which are evaluated to 0).
Elk more often than vice versa, but for Fame and Elk the situation is reversed (on a restricted
dataset, because Fame did not generate proofs in all cases).
Looking at individual examples, however, the simplicity of the Elk inference rules is clearly
an advantage when one wants to understand the generated proofs. In total, we could find
362 distinct “inference rules” used in the proofs generated using Lethe (up to renaming of
concept and role names). For Fame, we extracted 281 inference rules. This large diversity
is obviously not captured by the hypergraph size, but also not accurately represented by the
justification complexity, which only measures single inference steps. Moreover, understanding
inference steps formulated in ALCH or ALCOI is inherently harder than for pure ELH proofs.
In the appendix, we show some more examples of the generated proofs.
We also attempted some experiments on ALCH ontologies from the ORE dataset, but
were not able to extract many explanation tasks (that were not already in the ELH dataset),
mostly due to time and memory problems when computing all possible justifications for all
ALCH entailments using a black-box approach based on HermiT (for the ELH dataset we
could directly use Elk to compute all justifications).
6 Conclusion
We have investigated the complexity as well as the practical aspects of finding small proofs for
description logic entailments. Obviously, size is not enough to evaluate the difficulties users
face when trying to understand proofs, and even existing measures such as the justification
15
Small Proofs for DL Entailments Alrabbaa, Baader, Borgwardt, Koopmann, Kovtunova
0K 5K 10K
0K
5K
10K
LETHE (101)
F
A
M
E
(4
62
)
Just. complexity (sum)
0K 5K 10K
0K
5K
10K
ELK (411)
F
A
M
E
(2
14
)
Just. complexity (sum)
0K 5K 10K
0K
5K
10K
ELK (669)
L
E
T
H
E
(6
03
)
Just. complexity (sum)
0 250 500 750
0
250
500
750
LETHE (37)
F
A
M
E
(1
07
)
Just. complexity (max)
0 250 500 750
0
250
500
750
ELK (374)
F
A
M
E
(1
89
)
Just. complexity (max)
0 250 500 750
0
250
500
750
ELK (493)
L
E
T
H
E
(7
19
)
Just. complexity (max)
Figure 14: The total and maximal justification complexity [19] of proofs.
complexity model from [19] cannot capture all possible aspects of this problem. Hence, in future
work we will extend our results to more complex measures of understandability for proofs. We
conjecture that many of our results can be transferred, e.g. when the goal is to minimize the
sum of justification complexities we also obtain an NP-complete decision problem, whereas for
the maximum of justification complexities we expect a P-upper bound since such maxima can
also be computed by a greedy, Dijkstra-like approach.
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A Proofs Omitted from the Main Text
Since we investigative the problem of finding a minimal proof, we concentrate on proofs without
redundant elements.
Definition 22 (Redundant). We call a proof P for T |= η redundant if it properly contains
another proof for T |= η; otherwise it is non-redundant.
A non-redundant proof for T |= η cannot contain several vertices labeled with η, or two
inference steps that lead to the same vertex (proved by Lemma 23 (3) below). However, it is
still possible that there are two vertices labelled with the same sentence.
For proofs we can show some important properties.
Lemma 23. Let P = (V,E, `) be a proof for T |= η. Then
1. all paths in P are finite and all longest paths in P have vη as the target;
2. T |= η;
3. if P is non-redundant, there is no vertex w ∈ V s.t. there are (S1, w), (S2, w) ∈ E with
S1 6= S2.
Proof. The first statement trivially follows from the acyclicity and the only sink vη in P. The
length of a path in P can be bounded by |V |.
The second claim can be shown by an induction on the depth of P. Namely, for every k
and every w ∈ V s.t. all paths leading to w have length at most k it holds that T |= `(w). The
induction base follows from the fact that the leafs are labelled with the sentences from T . For
the induction step, for a vertex w ∈ V , we consider an hyperedge (S,w) ∈ E. Every s ∈ S
satisfies the induction hypothesis and, thus, T |= `(s). By P being a derivation structure, it
holds {`(s)|s ∈ S} |= `(w) and, by transitivity of model-based entailment, T |= `(w).
Now, we consider a non-redundant P. Assume that there is a vertex w ∈ V with two
incoming edges, (S1, w) and (S2, w). By removing one of the edges, say (S1, w), and, if a vertex
v ∈ S1 becomes a sink, removing it and all its incoming edges (S, v), and continuing recursively
in this fashion, we obtain a proper substructure of P. The new derivation structure still has
the original sink vη from P and no cycles can be created by the described procedure. This
contradicts P being non-redundant.
Since redundant proofs will in general not be minimal, we can restrict most of our consid-
erations to non-redundant proofs.
Lemma 8. There exists a substructure in D(T , η) which is a minimal proof.
Proof. Let P = (V,E, `) be a minimal proof w.r.t. D(T , η). By definition, there is a homo-
morphism h : P → D(T , η). We show that h is injective. Assume to the contrary that there
are two vertices v, v′ ∈ V with h(v) = h(v′), which implies that `(v) = `(v′). If there is no
path between v and v′ in P, then we can construct P ′ by renaming all occurrences of v in P
to v′. This operation does not introduce any leafs, sinks, or cycles (in particular no cycles
involving the sink of P), and hence P ′ is still a proof for T |= η. But vert(P ′) < vert(P), which
contradicts minimality of P.
It remains to deal with the case where there is a path between v and v′. In this case,
we ensure that v and v′ are not connected anymore before merging them. Since P is acyclic,
we can assume that there is a path from v to v′, but no path from v′ to v. We now start
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from v′ and remove v′ and all hyperedges of the form (S, v′) from P, which already destroys
any paths from v to v′. However, this operation may make some vertices w ∈ S into sinks, and
we continue removing such w and hyperedges (S′, w) until either no new sinks are produced
or we have reached v. The only remaining loose ends are the hyperedges (S, d) in P that still
contain v′ ∈ S. In such hyperedges, we replace v′ by v, effectively merging the two vertices. If
there was no such hyperedge, then v′ was the sink of P, i.e., `(v′) = η, and v will now be the
new sink with `(v) = `(v′) = η.
We show that the result P ′ of this procedure is still a proof, which has less vertices than P,
which again contradicts our assumption on P. Since our procedure removes edges only together
with their destination vertices, it cannot produce new leafs, and hence all leafs are still labeled
by sentences from T . Clearly, all remaining edges are sound since they were already sound
in P. As argued above, we have also kept the property that there is exactly one sink, which is
labeled with η. Finally, all cycles in P ′ can be traced back to paths in P that involve both v
and v′. But we have assumed that there are no paths from v′ to v, and have destroyed all paths
from v to v′.
This shows that h must be injective, and therefore its image h(P) is isomorphic to P. This
means that h(P) is a substructure of D(T , η) which is a proof for T |= η that is also minimal
because vert(h(P)) = vert(P).
We first show the upper bounds for the second row of Table 1.
Theorem 9. MPpolybinary(D) is in NP and MP
exp
binary(D) is in NExpTime.
Proof. We start by guessing a substructure P of D(T , η). This can be done in polynomial time
in the size of D(T , η), which for MPpolybinary is polynomial in the size of T and η, and for MPexpbinary
is exponential. This substructure P is necessarily sound and checking the remaining conditions
of Definitions 2 and 4 and that P is not larger than n can be done in polynomial time in the
number of vertices in P.
In the case of MPexpunary(D), we can also show an NP-upper bound, but for this we have to be
more careful about how we access the structure D(T , η), which is already of exponential size.
Namely, we make a few additional assumptions about how the deriver works. These assump-
tions do not make a difference for the other cases, but enable us to actually guess a structure
of polynomial size (at most n vertices and one edge for each vertex) without needing to store
D(T , η), which is of exponential size.
Let D = (V,E, `) := D(T , η). We assume that the vertices V = {v1, . . . , vm} are numbered
consecutively, where m is an index of polynomial size (in binary notation). Hence, in order to
address a single vertex vi, we only need access to its index i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, instead of to the whole
set V . Furthermore, we only access the structure D by means of two oracle functions
[D](v1, . . . , vl) :=
{
true if ({v1, . . . , vl−1}, vl) ∈ E,
false otherwise;
[D](v, α) :=
{
true if `(v) = α,
false otherwise.
where v, v1, . . . , vl are vertices (represented by their indices) and α is an sentence. These
functions hide any details of the internal representation of D. For example, if v1, . . . , vm is
an efficient indexing scheme for the (exponentially many) sentences in D, then the call to
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[D](v1, . . . , vl) can be answered by retrieving the sentences α1, . . . , αl corresponding to v1, . . . , vl
in polynomial time and checking whether α1 . . . αl−1αl is a valid rule instance.Having fixed a theory T and a sentence η, by this restricted view on the exponentially large
output of a deriver, we can show the following result.
Theorem 10. MPexpunary(D) is in NP.
Proof. Using the setup described above, we can guess n′ ≤ n vertices vi1 , . . . , vin′ and for each
vertex at most one incoming edge (Sij , vij ) with Sij ⊆ {vi1 , . . . , vin′ }, in polynomial time in
the sizes of n, T , and η. Recall that we can restrict our search to non-redundant proofs here
since we are looking for minimal proofs anyway. We can then check the following conditions to
ensure that we have guessed a valid proof.
First, we make sure that every guessed edge ({v1, . . . , vl−1}, vl) is actually an edge in D
by calling [D](v1, . . . , vl); this also guarantees soundness of the proof since D is a derivation
structure. To check completeness, we use [D](v, α) to ensure that any vertex v for which we have
not guessed an incoming edge is labeled by some α ∈ T . Finally, we use several reachability
checks in the guessed structure to make sure that there is a unique sink, which is labeled by η,
and that there are no cycles.
As a consequence of the theorem above, MPpolyunary(D) is also in NP. Moreover, the NP-
hardness can be shown by a reduction of the hitting set problem [16], which is inspired by a
proof about minimal justifications in [8].
Theorem 11. There is a polynomial deriver D such that MPpolyunary(D) is NP-hard.
Proof. Given a finite set U = {u1, . . . , ul}, sets si ⊆ U , 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and a number m ∈ N, we
need to decide whether there is a set s ⊆ U of size less than m such that si ∩ s 6= ∅, 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
We use an instance of MPpolyunary(ELK) with an EL-TBox T , sentence η and number n as follows.
Let A,B,U1, . . . , Ul, S1, . . . , Sk be concept names. T contains the following sentences:
A v Ui, for every i, 1 ≤ i ≤ l;
Ui v Sj , for every ui ∈ sj , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, 1 ≤ i ≤ l;
S1 u · · · u Sk v B.
A proof of η := A v B over T using the inference rules of ELK [25] first derives A v Sj for each
j, 1 ≤ j ≤ k, from A v Ui and Ui v Sj by rule Rv (see Figure 1) for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ l, where
the same sentence A v Ui can be used for different Sj . Then it composes the sentences A v Sj
into A v S1 u · · · u Sk with R+u using k − 1 inference steps, before finally deriving A v B with
the help of S1 u · · · u Sk v B and Rv. The number of sentences in this proof is m′ + 3k + 1,
where m′ is the number of sentences A v Ui, which represent the hitting set s. Hence, there is a
hitting set of size ≤ m iff there a proof as described above with ≤ n := m+ 3k+ 1 vertices.
The result in Theorem 11 also provides the lower bound for all problems in Table 1. However,
for an exponential deriver and binary encoding, we are able to strengthen it to NExpTime.
We first state a result on tiling problems to simplify the proof of the theorem. We consider
the following exponential tiling problem: given a set T of tiles, two sets h, v ⊆ T×T of horizontal
and vertical tiling conditions, an initial sequence t0, . . . , ts ∈ T of tiles, and a number n encoded
in unary, decide whether there exists a function f : [0, 2n − 1] × [0, 2n − 1] → T such that
f(i, 0) = ti for 0 ≤ i ≤ s, 〈f(i, j), f(i+1, j)〉 ∈ h and 〈f(j, i), f(j, i+1)〉 ∈ v for all i ∈ [0, 2n−2]
and j ∈ [0, 2n − 1]. This problem is known to be NExpTime-complete [40]. Furthermore, it is
sufficient to consider a variant for which s = 0.
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CR1 if A ∈ K and K appears in T ′
K v A
M v A for all A ∈ K, K v C
CR2 if M appears in T ′
M v C
M v ∃r.L L v ∀r−.ACR3
M v A
L v ∃r.M L v ∀r.ACR4
L v ∃r.(M uA)
Figure 15: The inference rules for ELI [5]. Given a TBox T in a normal form, the rules produce
a saturated TBox T ′. Here, K,L,M are conjunctions of concept names, A is a concept name,
C is an ELI concept of the form A, ∃r.M , or ∀r.A, and r is a role name or the inverse of a role
name. In this calculus conjunctions are implicitly viewed as sets, i.e., the order and multiplicity
of conjuncts is ignored.
Lemma 24. Let T , h, v ⊆ T × T , n and t0, . . . , ts ∈ T be a tiling problem. Then, there exists
a tiling problem T ′, h′, v′ ⊆ T ′ × T ′ with just one initial tile t′0 ∈ T that has a solution iff the
original tiling problem has a solution.
Proof. We assign to every tile ti, 1 ≤ i ≤ s, a unique fresh tile t′i, and then define the new tiling
problem as follows.
h′ = h ∪ {〈t′0, t′1〉, . . . , 〈t′s−1, t′s〉}
∪ {〈t′s, t〉 | 〈ts, t〉 ∈ h}
v′ = v ∪ {〈t′i, t〉 | 0 ≤ i ≤ s, 〈ti, t〉 ∈ v}.
It is easy to verify that this tiling problem satisfies the requirements.
Theorem 12. There is an exponential deriver D such that MPexpbinary(D) is NExpTime-hard.
Proof. We use the deriver generated by the calculus for ELI shown in Figure 15, assuming that
no sentence labels more than one vertex. The calculus is taken from [5] with small modifications:
• While the authors assume the input to use at most two conjuncts on the left-hand side, we
do not impose such a restriction. It is not hard to see that lifting this restriction neither
affects soundness nor completeness of the method, and does not have an impact on the
complexity of the problem considered.
• The authors of [5] use a special set notation to represent n-ary conjunctions in inferred
sentences. We just use n-ary conjunctions instead of sets, and assume that those are
treated silently as sets when rules are applied: that is, conjunctions never have duplicate
conjuncts and the order is not important.
To show NExpTime-hardness for this deriver, we describe a reduction from the exponential
tiling problem with one initial tile. In the following, let T , h, v ∈ T × T and t0 ∈ T be such a
tiling problem. For i, 1 ≤ i ≤ |h|, let hi denote the ith element of h, and for i, 1 ≤ i ≤ |v|, let
vi denote the ith element of v. Furthermore, let TI ⊆ T be the set of tiles that occur at least
once as first component in h or v.
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For the first reduction, consider the number of sentences m := m1 +m2 +m3 +m4, which
will be the size of the proof, where
m1 := 4n2 + 6n+ |h|+ |v|+ 7,
m2 := (2n − 1)2(10n+ 3) + 2(2n − 1)(6n+ 2)− (2n+ 1),
m3 := 6(2n − 1) + 5(2n − 1)2 + 1, and
m4 := |TI |+ 7 · (|v|+ |h|) + 2,
which can be computed in polynomial time when encoded in binary, and the TBox T = T1∪T2
shown in Figure 16 and 18. In the reduction, we enforce the grid-shape of the tiling using the
size restriction of the proof. This means that we have to be very careful with the use of auxiliary
sentences: if those are not needed in every proof, this could introduce degrees of freedom in
other parts of the proof, so that we fail to enforce this grid-shape. Therefore, we have to make
sure that the number of auxiliary sentences used is always the same independent of the tiling
solution. Specifically, not all of the vertical or horizontal tiling conditions might be relevant
for a tiling solution, but the axioms used to encode them must be used in every proof of our
entailment. T1 in Figure 16 contains the main reduction of the tiling problem, while T2 in
Figure 16 makes sure that all of the sentences used to encode the tiling conditions are necessary
for the proof.
We use concept names Ai, Ai, Bi, Bi 1 ≤ i ≤ n, to encode two binary counters for the x- and
the y-coordinates in the tiling, respectively, where Ai denotes that the i-th bit has a value of 1,
and Ai that the i-th bit has a value of 0, and correspondingly for B. For a number i ∈ [0, 2n−1],
we use [A = i] as an abbreviation of the conjunction of concepts Ai, Ai that corresponds to a
counter value of i, and correspondingly for [B = i]. We prove that T |= Start v Success has a
proof using ≤ m sentences iff the given tiling problem has a condition-complete solution.
(⇐): Assume that the tiling problem has a solution f . We describe how a proof of
T |= Start v Success can be constructed. In this proof, we use concepts of the form
C(i, j) := f(i, j) u [A = i] u [B = j]
on the left-hand side of GCIs to identify individual grid cells (i, j), and the right-hand side of
such GCIs to derive properties of these cells. The way the tiling is represented in the proof is
sketched in Figure 17, which we will explain step-by-step. An arrow labeled with rx from (i, j)
to (i+ 1, j) represents a sentence of the form
C(i, j) v ∃rx.C(i+ 1, j),
where i ∈ [0, 2n − 2] and j ∈ [0, 2n − 1], unless i = j = 0, in which case it represents a sentence
of the form Start v ∃rx.C(1, 0). We abbreviate these sentences by H(i, j), and do likewise for
the sentences V (i, j) connecting cells (i, j) and (i, j + 1) using ry in the vertical direction:
C(i, j) v ∃ry.C(i, j + 1),
where i ∈ [0, 2n − 1] and j ∈ [0, 2n − 2], unless i = j = 0 in which case it represents
Start v ∃ry.C(0, 1).
The concepts X on the cells (i, j) shown in Figure 17 are those for which we will derive
sentences C(i, j) v X. For clarity, this figure does not include the sentences where X is one of
the conjuncts of C(i, j).
We construct the proof in four phases, using m1, m2, m3 and m4 sentences, respectively.
Phases (I)–(III) encode the tiling solution based on T1 in a proof for Start v Finish, Phase (IV)
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Start v Ai, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (1)
Start v Bi, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (2)
Start v t0 (3)
Ai v ∀ry.Ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (4)
Ai v ∀ry.Ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (5)
Bi v ∀rx.Bi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (6)
Bi v ∀rx.Bi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (7)
Ai u
l
j<i
Aj v ∀rx.Ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (8)
Ai u
l
j<i
Aj v ∀rx.Ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (9)
Ai uAj v ∀rx.Ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j < i (10)
Ai uAj v ∀rx.Ai for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j < i (11)
Bi u
l
j<i
Bj v ∀ry.Bi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (12)
Bi u
l
j<i
Bj v ∀ry.Bi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n (13)
Bi uBj v ∀rx.Bi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j < i (14)
Bi uBj v ∀rx.Bi for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j < i (15)
t v ∃rx.t′ for all 〈t, t′〉 ∈ h (16)
t v ∃ry.t′ for all 〈t, t′〉 ∈ v (17)
t u [A = 2n−1] u [B = 2n−1] v Finish for all t ∈ T (18)
Finish v ∀r−x .Finishx (19)
Finish v ∀r−y .Finishy (20)
Finishx u [B = 2n − 1] v Finish (21)
Finishy u [A = 2n − 1] v Finish (22)
Finishx u Finishy v Finish (23)
Figure 16: The TBox T1 used in the reduction for Theorem 11.
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∃rx.f(1, 0)
∃ry.f(0, 1)
∀rx.A1 . . . ∀rx.An
∀rx.B1 . . . ∀rx.Bn
∀ry.A1 . . . ∀rx.An
∀ry.B1 . . . ∀rx.Bn
Finishx Finishy Finish
∃rx.f(1, 1)
∃ry.f(0, 2)
∀rx.A1 . . . ∀rx.An
∀rx.B1 . . . ∀rx.Bn
∀ry.A1 . . . ∀rx.An
∀ry.B1 . . . ∀rx.Bn
Finishx Finishy Finish
∀r−y .Finishy
.
.
.
∃rx.f(1, 2n−1)
∀rx.A1 . . . ∀rx.An
∀rx.B1 . . . ∀rx.Bn
Finishx Finish
∀r−y .Finishy
. .
.
. .
.
· · ·
∃rx.f(2n−1, 2n−1)
∀rx.A1 . . . ∀rx.An
∀rx.B1 . . . ∀rx.Bn
Finishx Finish
∀r−x .Finishx
∀r−y .Finishx
∃rx.f(2, 0)
∃ry.f(1, 1)
∀rx.A1 . . . ∀rx.An
∀rx.B1 . . . ∀rx.Bn
∀ry.A1 . . . ∀rx.An
∀ry.B1 . . . ∀rx.Bn
Finishx Finishy Finish
∀r−x .Finishx
· · ·
∃ry.f(2n−1, 1)
∀ry.A1 . . . ∀ry.An
∀ry.B1 . . . ∀ry.Bn
Finishy Finish
∀r−x .Finishx
.
.
.
∃ry.f(2n−1, 2n−1)
∀ry.A1 . . . ∀ry.An
∀ry.B1 . . . ∀ry.Bn
Finishy Finish
∀r−x .Finishx
∀r−y .Finishx
Finish
∀r−x .Finishx
∀r−y .Finishy
0 1 2n−1
0
1
2n−1
rx
rx
rx rx rx
rx rx
ry ry ry
ry
ry
ry
ry
Figure 17: The sentences encoding a solution of the tiling problem.
takes care of T2, completing the proof to a proof for Start v Success. In Phase (I), we
add all sentences of T1 to the proof, except that for (18), we choose only the sentence with
t = f(2n − 1, 2n − 1), i.e., the tile on the upper right cell of the grid (see Figure 17). This
amounts to exactly m1 = 4n2 + 6n+ |h|+ |v|+ 7 sentences.
In Phase (II), we derive all necessary sentences H(i, j) and V (i, j) for the whole grid. For
H(i, j), we first consider the special case where i = j = 0. In this case, we have the sentences
Start v X for every X occurring in C(0, 0). Using one of the sentences (4)–(15) introduced in
Phase (I), we can then use CR2 to obtain exactly 2n sentences of the form
Start v ∀rx.Y,
where Y ranges over the conjuncts in [A = 1] u [B = 0], and one sentence
Start v ∃rx.f(1, 0)
via (16) since 〈f(0, 0), f(1, 0)〉 ∈ h. Finally, we use a sequence of applications of CR4 to obtain
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H(0, 0) through 2n intermediate sentences that are also unique to this part of the proof. Thus,
H(0, 0) is proven using 4n+ 1 additional sentences.
For the remaining H(i, j), we proceed similarly. We first derive exactly 2n+ 1 sentences of
the form
C(i, j) v X,
where X ranges over the concept names in C(i, j), using CR1. These sentences may be shared
with the proof of V (i, j) in case that j ≤ 2n − 2. We note that C(1, 0) syntactically occurs
in H(0, 0), which makes this application of CR1 possible for C(1, 0). The remaining rule ap-
plications in this phase make sure that the remaining conceps C(i, j) are all introduced, one
after the other, so that CR1 is applicable for all C(i, j). Using one of the sentences (4)–(15)
introduced in Phase (I), we can then use CR2 to obtain exactly 2n sentences of the form
C(i, j) v ∀rx.Y,
where Y ranges over the conjuncts in [A = i+ 1] u [B = j], and one sentence
C(i, j) v ∃rx.f(i+ 1, j)
via (16) since 〈f(i, j), f(i+ 1, j)〉 ∈ h. These sentences are unique to H(i, j). Using a sequence
of applications of CR4 we then obtain H(i, j) through 2n intermediate sentences that are also
unique to this part of the proof. Thus, for each H(i, j), where we do not have i = j = 0, we
use 6n + 2 sentences. The sentences V (i, j) are obtained in a similar way, but using 2n + 1
sentences already used for H(i, j). In total, Phase (II) uses
m2 = (2n − 1)2(10n+ 3) + 2(2n − 1)(6n+ 2)− (2n+ 1)
sentences, namely (2n+ 1) + 2(4n+ 1) = (10n+ 3) for each inner cell (i, j ∈ [0, 2n − 2]), where
the sentences derived using CR1 are shared between H(i, j) and V (i, j), and
(2n+ 1) + (2n+ 1) + 2n = (6n+ 2)
for each “border” cell with either i = 2n − 1 or j = 2n − 1 (but not both), where only one of
H(i, j) or V (i, j) needs to be derived. To get H(0, 0) and V (0, 0), we need 8n+ 2 sentences in
complete, which are 2n+ 1 less than for the other cells, which is why this number is subtracted
in the end.
In Phase (III), we derive all sentences of the form
C(i, j) v Finish.
We start with (18) and (19), which can be combined into
C(2n − 1, 2n − 1) v ∀r−x .Finishx
using CR2, which together with H(2n − 2, 2n − 1) yields
C(2n − 2, 2n − 1) v Finishx
by CR3, and finally
C(2n − 2, 2n − 1) v Finish
by CR2 and (21) together with the sentences C(2n − 2, 2n − 1) v Bi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, from
Phase (I). We can use this sentence in analogy to (18) to continue this process until we reach
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Start v ∃r.t for every t ∈ TI (24)
t v ∀rx.Hi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |h|, hi = 〈t, t′〉 (25)
t v ∀ry.Vi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |v|, vi = 〈t, t′〉 (26)
Hi u t′ v ∀r−x .Hi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |h|, hi = 〈t, t′〉 (27)
Vi u t′ v ∀r−y .Vi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |h|, vi = 〈t, t′〉 (28)
Hi v ∀r−.Hi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |h| (29)
Vi v ∀r−.Vi for every 1 ≤ i ≤ |v| (30)
Finish u
l
i≤|h|
Hi u
l
i≤|v|
Vi v Success (31)
Figure 18: TBox T2 enforcing the use of sentences (16) and (17).
C(0, 2n − 1) v Finish. Thus, we have labeled all cells in the last row of Figure 17 with Finish,
and we can proceed similarly with the last column.
For the remaining cells we can proceed similarly, but need to derive both Finishx and Finishy
each time. Let 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 2n − 2, i 6= 0 or j 6= 0, and assume that we have already derived
C(i + 1, j) v Finish and C(i, j + 1) v Finish for the right and upper neighbor of cell (i, j),
respectively. We next derive
C(i+ 1, j) v ∀r−x .Finishx and C(i, j + 1) v ∀r−y .Finishy
using CR2 and Sentences (19) and (20), respectively. We then obtain
C(i, j) v Finishx and C(i, j) v Finishy
via CR3 using H(i, j) and V (i, j), respectively. Finally, CR2 allows us to derive
C(i, j) v Finish
together with (23).
For the case of i = j = 0, similar applications result in the desired sentence Start v Finish.
The total number of new sentences Phase (III) is m3 = 6(2n − 1) + 5(2n − 1)2, namely 3 for
each cell in the last row or the last column of the grid and 5 for each inner cell.
In Phase (IV), we now prove Start v Success, making sure that really every sentence intro-
duced in Phase (I) is required for the proof. For this, we need to prove Start v Hi for every
horizontal tiling condition hi, and Start v Vi for every vertical tiling condition vi. We infer
Start v Hi by first inferring t v ∃rx.(t′ uHi) for hi = 〈t, t′〉 using (25) and (16), then t v Hi
using (27), t v ∀r−.Hi using (29), and finally Start v Hi using (24). For Start v Vi, we proceed
similarly. In complete, for both Start v Hi and Start v Vi, |TI | + 7 · (|v| + |h|) sentences are
needed (the sentences (24) only need to be counted once).Note that also every sentence of the
form (16) and (17) must be used in this proof. The final proof for Start v Success needs 2 addi-
tional sentences ((31) and the conclusion), so that Phase (IV) needs m4 = |TI |+7 ·(|v|+ |h|)+2
additional sentences in complete. We obtain that the complete proof for Start v Success has a
size of m.
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v
P|v
v′
P|v′
P
v
P|v′
v
P|v′
P ′
Figure 19: Transformation made in the proof of Lemma 25 for v, v′ ∈ V with `(v) = `(v′)
(⇒): Assume that there is a proof of T |= Start v Finish that uses m = m1 +m2 +m3 +m4
sentences or less. Any such proof must follow the general scheme laid out above, since one
cannot get from C(2n − 1, 2n − 1) v Finish to C(0, 0) v Finish without going through all tiles
(i, j) ∈ [0, 2n − 1] × [0, 2n − 1]. Hence, one needs to derive appropriate sentences H(i, j) and
V (i, j) first, for some choice of tile types. It can also be verified that none of the individual
derivation steps can be achieved using fewer intermediate sentences. Spcifically, every sen-
tence (16) and (17) must be used exactly once in such a proof, due to Phase (IV). Thus, the
tight bound of m requires that, for each cell (i, j), at most one concept of the form C(i, j)
occurs in the proof, i.e., each cell is assigned a unique tile f(i, j) ∈ T . This yields a solution
of the tiling problem due to the horizontal and vertical compatibility relations encoded in (16)
and (17).
Now we can proceed to the tree-shaped proof representation (see Table 2).
Lemma 15. There is a tree proof P for T |= η that is admissible w.r.t. D = D(T , η) with
vert(P) ≤ m iff D∗ contains a hyperpath P ′ from s to a vertex t labeled with η withWP′(P ′) ≤ m.
We first prove an auxiliary result that allows us to restrict the search to tree proofs of a
specific form, in a way similar to Lemma 8. Given a tree proof P = (V,E, `) and v ∈ V , we
denote by P|v the subtree of P with root v (which is a proof of `(v)). Moreover, P is called
regular if, whenever `(v) = `(v′), then P|v and P|v′ are isomorphic.
Lemma 25. There exists a minimal tree proof for T |= η in D that is regular.
Proof. Let P = (V,E, `) be a minimal tree proof that is not regular. Then there are v, v′ ∈ V
such that P|v and P|v′ are not isomorphic. We choose v such that vert(P|v) is minimal among
all possible choices of v and v′, and therefore vert(P|v) ≤ vert(P|v′). We now follow a similar
strategy as in the proof of Lemma 8, but instead of merging v and v′ we replace P|v′ in P by
a copy of P|v. By similar arguments as for Lemma 8, this results in another proof P ′ that is
admissible w.r.t. D(T , η), which is clearly also still a tree. Since P is minimal, it is impossible
that vert(P|v) < vert(P|v′), which means that vert(P ′) = vert(P).
We can continue in this fashion (depicted in Figure 19) until we obtain a regular proof
with the same number of vertices as P. This process terminates since by our choice of v the
subtree Pv cannot contain another vertex that violates the regularity condition, and thus by
replacing P|v′ with P|v we always decrease the number of pairs (v, v′) that violate the regularity
condition.
Hence, in the following we can focus on regular tree proofs. Next, we draw a connection
between non-redundant proofs and hyperpaths.
Lemma 26. A derivation structure P = (V,E, `) over T is a non-redundant proof for T |= η
iff P∗ is a hyperpath from s to a vertex vη s.t. `(vη) = η.
29
Small Proofs for DL Entailments Alrabbaa, Baader, Borgwardt, Koopmann, Kovtunova
Proof. In order to show that P∗ is a hyperpath, we note that, trivially, s, vη ∈ V ∗. Now, for
any v ∈ V , we show that v is reachable from s in P∗. All leaves of P and those vertices v
with an “empty” incoming edge (∅, v) are reachable from s in P∗ by the edges we added to E∗.
Moreover, all other vertices are reachable from at least one such leaf. There can be no cycle
through s, because it has only outgoing edges. Hence, any cycle in P∗ would contradict the
acyclicity of P. Finally, minimality of P∗ follows from non-redundancy of P.
For the opposite direction, if the hyperpath P∗ from s to vη contains another sink, we can
build a smaller hypergraph P ′ by exhaustively removing sinks v 6= vη and all their incoming
edges. This hypergraph is also a hyperpath from s to vη, which contradicts the minimality
condition in Definition 14 for P∗. Acyclicity of the proof P follows from the acyclicity of P∗.
Non-redundancy follows from the minimality of hyperpaths.
We can now finish the proof of Lemma 15 by noting that, for any hyperpath P∗ as in
Lemma 26, we can unravel the corresponding proof P into a regular tree proof P ′ (thereby
recursively introducing copies of subtrees that are used in multiple inference steps). A homo-
morphism h : P ′ → D can be defined accordingly. Since the recursive definition ofWP∗(P∗) adds
a summand of 1 for every time a vertex occurs in an edge in P∗, we have vert(P ′) = WP∗(P∗).
Conversely, for a regular tree proof P ′ with a homomorphism h : P → D, we can find a corre-
sponding non-redundant proof P in D and obtain a hyperpath P∗ with WP∗(P∗) = vert(P ′)
by the same arguments as above.
We can show a matching lower bound by reducing a standard reasoning problem toMTP(D).
Theorem 17. There exists a polynomial deriver D such that MTPpolyunary(D) is P-hard under
LogSpace-reductions.
Proof. We reduce the entailment problem of a GCI A v B from an EL-TBox T in, which is
P-hard already when A and B are concept names and T does not contain existential restric-
tions ∃r.D, because then EL is equivalent to propositional Horn logic (see [14] for details). We
will reduce this problem to MTP(ELK), where n is encoded in unary and we can restrict our
attention to the rules from Figure 1 that do not use existential restrictions. The challenge is
to find T ′ and n such that T ′ |= A v B holds and there is a tree proof P for A v B over T ′
with vert(P) ≤ n iff T |= A v B. According to [25], the size of ELK(T , A v B) is bounded
polynomially in |T |. However, for our purposes, we need to show that the minimal tree proof
admissible w.r.t. this derivation structure is similarly bounded.
Claim. There is a polynomial p such that, for any TBox T and GCI A v B as above,
the minimal tree proof for A v B over T that is admissible w.r.t. ELK(T , A v B) satisfies
vert(P) ≤ p(|T |).
Proof of claim. Since T does not contain existential restrictions, we can assume that all GCIs
in T are of the form A1u· · ·uAm v B1u· · ·uBk (*), where A1, . . . , Am, B1, . . . , Bk are concept
names, the order and multiplicity of concept names is irrelevant, and we view > as the “empty”
conjunction. The basic idea is to use unit propagation [14] as for Horn clauses to derive all
consequences, including A v B. That is, starting from GCIs of the form A v B1 u . . . Bk, we
“propagate” the GCIs A v Bj to other GCIs where Bj occurs on the left-hand side. Once
we have derived GCIs A v Ai for all concept names Ai on the left hand side of a GCI
A1 u · · · u Am v C1 u . . . Ck, then we can also “propagate” the GCIs A v Cj , and so on
until we reach A v B. However, we have to choose a strategy that results in a polynomially
sized proof tree, which means that we need to avoid using a derived GCI in several following
inference steps to avoid duplicating the whole subproof in the tree.
We use the following strategy to compute a tree proof for T |= A v B:
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1. Initialize the conjunction X := A of already “propagated” concept names, for which we
can derive the GCI A v X using the inference rule R0.
2. Select all GCIs of the form (*) from T for which all of A1, . . . , Am occur in X.
3. Extend these GCIs to X v B1 u · · · u Bk by first deriving X v X via R0, from this
X v A1 u · · · u Am by splitting X on the right-hand side using R−u , and then combining
this GCI with the original GCI of the form (*) by Rv.
4. Combine all selected GCIs, which now have the same left-hand side X, into a single
sentence X v Y , where Y is the conjunction of all concept names Bj on the right-hand
sides of the selected GCIs, using the rule R+u .
5. Combine this GCI with X v X (from R0) to obtain X v X u Y via R+u .
6. Derive A v X u Y from A v X and X v X u Y by Rv.
7. Continue with Step 2 X u Y in place of X.
It can be checked that the resulting tree proof derives most sentences only once, except for
ones that can be derived using a linear proof (where each hyperedge (S, d) satisfies |S| = 1)
of polynomial size. For example, the GCI X v A1 u · · · u Am may be derived several times if
several GCIs in T have the same left-hand side, but this cannot cause an exponential growth
of this tree w.r.t. the size of T .
Taking the polynomial p from our claim, we set n := p(|T |) and
T ′ := T ∪ {A v A1, A1 v A2, . . . , An v B},
where A1, . . . , An are concept names not occurring in T . Clearly, T ′ |= A v B and the existence
of a tree proof P for A v B over T ′ with vert(P) ≤ n is equivalent to T |= A v B, since any proof
that uses the new concept names must use at least n+1 sentences. Moreover, we can compute n
(in binary representation) and output it in unary representation using a logarithmically space-
bounded Turing machine, and similarly for T ′. Hence, the above construction constitutes the
desired LogSpace-reduction.
We conjecture that an ExpTime-lower bound for MTPexpbinary(D) could be shown in a similar
fashion, by using a binary counter to enforce an artificial proof of A v B that has exponentially
many vertices. However, so far we were not successful in finding a concrete exponential deriver
where we could show an exponential upper bound on the size of minimal tree proofs.
We show NP-hardness for finding a tree proof (of size less than n) for ExpTime-complete
ELI, the extension of EL by inverse roles.
Theorem 18. There is an exponential deriver D such that MTPexpunary(D) is NP-hard.
Proof. We show hardness using the deriver that uses the ELI-calculus shown in Figure 15,
thus showing that the problem is already hard for that specific deriver. We will provide a
translation of the SAT problem to MTPexpunary(D). In SAT, we are given a Boolean formula of the
form ϕ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cm over a finite set of variables {x1, . . . , xn}, where each ci is a disjunction
of literals (variables or its negations), and we want to decide whether ϕ is decidable.
Without loss of generality, we assume that for every variable xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have a
corresponding clause xi∨¬xi. Given such a formula ϕ, we construct a TBox Tϕ s.t. Tϕ |= A v F
can be shown with a tree proof of size 2n+ 4m+ 9 iff ϕ is satisfiable.
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For every variable xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we use the following sentences which are supposed to
“guess” the value of xi:
A v ∀r.Xi, A v ∀r.Xi.
For every clause cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, we add
Xi v ∀r.Cj , for every literal of the form xi ∈ cj , and
Xi v ∀r.Cj , for every literal of the form ¬xi ∈ cj .
In addition, we use the following sentences whose meaning will become clear below.
A v ∃r.B, B v ∃r.>,
C1 u . . . u Cm v ∀r−.F, F v ∀r−.F
We show that ϕ is satisfiable iff Tϕ |= A v F can be shown using a tree proof with 2n+4m+9
vertices.
(⇒): We first show that, given an assignment v : {x1, . . . , xn} → {0, 1} that makes ϕ true,
we can construct a tree proof for Tϕ |= A v F with 2n + 4m + 9 vertices. The assignment v
can be expressed as a conjunction over the set
V = {Xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, v(xi) = 1} ∪ {Xi | 1 ≤ i ≤ n, v(xi) = 0}.
In the proof, we step-wise infer the sentence A v ∃r.(B u dV) using rule CR4, the sentence
A v ∃r.B, and for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the respective sentence A v ∀r.Xi or A v ∀r.Xi, depending
on whether v(xi) = 1 or v(xi) = 0. This creates a subtree of the final proof of size 2n+ 1.
Since A v ∃r.(B udV) can be derived, we can use CR1 to infer B udV v B. Using CR2
on this sentence and B v ∃r.> ∈ Tϕ, we infer B u
dV v ∃r.>. Starting from this sentence, we
step-wise use CR4 to infer
B u
l
V v ∃r.(C1 u . . . u Cm),
where in each step, we use for a different clause Cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m, some sentence Xi v ∀r.Cj ∈ Tϕ
or Xi v ∀r.Cj ∈ Tϕ, depending on whether v(xi) = 0 or v(xi) = 1. This construction results in
another subtree of the proof which has a size of 4m+3 (note that for each step, we need to derive
BudV v Xi (or BudV v Xi) and BudV v ∀r.Cj as intermediate axioms to be able to apply
CR4). We further extend this tree by inferring B udV v F using C1 u . . .uCm v ∀r−.F ∈ Tϕ
and CR3. This uses another 2 vertices, so that the resulting sub-tree of the proof has size
4m + 5. Finally, we use CR2 on this sentence and F v ∀r−.F ∈ Tϕ, resulting in a sub-tree of
size 4m+ 7 with its root labeled B udV v ∀r−.F .
We now have one sub-tree of size 2n + 1 with its root labelled A v ∃r.(B udV), and one
subtree of size 4m+ 7 with its root labeled with B udV v ∀r−.F . We connect both subtrees
using CR3, resulting in a proof for A v F of size 2n+ 4m+ 9.
(⇐): For the other direction, assume that Tϕ |= A v F can be shown using a proof of
size 2n + 4m + 9. We demonstrate how we can construct from such proof an assignment
v : {x1, . . . , xn} → {0, 1} that satisfies ϕ. A proof of Tϕ |= A v F needs to infer at some point
sentences of the following form:
A v ∃r.C, C v ∀r−.F,
C v F, C v ∃r.(C1 u . . . u Cm).
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The sentences in Tϕ only allow to infer A v ∃r.C provided that C is a conjunction of B with
concept names from the set {X1, X1, . . ., Xn, Xn}. The shape of C is further restricted by
the fact that we can only infer C v ∃r.(C1 u . . .uCm) provided that C contains B as conjunct,
and at least one conjunct of the form Xi or Xi for each variable xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. The latter is
enforced since for every such variable xi, there is some clause cj = xi ∨ ¬xi, so that Cj occurs
under a universal restriction only in the sentences Xi v ∀r.Cj and Xi v ∀r.Cj in Tϕ.
A proof for C v ∃r.(C1 u . . . u Cm) requires at least 4m + 3 vertices (1 for C v B, 2 for
C v ∃r.>, and then we need to derive each C v ∀r.Cj by CR2 from C v Xi / C v Xi and
Xi v ∀r.Cj / Xi v ∀r.Cj , and another m steps of CR4 to obtain the goal). Inferring from
this C v F and then C v ∀r−.F requires 2 more vertices each, so that at this point, at least
4m + 7 vertices of the proof have been assigned. As we still need to infer A v F , this leaves
2n + 1 vertices for proving A v ∃r.C. For this, we need to use the sentence A v ∃r.B once,
and 2 vertices for every additional conjunct in C, meaning that C has at most n+ 1 conjuncts.
C is a conjunction of B and at least one of Xi and Xi for each xi 1 ≤ i ≤ n. As there are at
most n conjuncts, this means that for every xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, C contains exactly one conjunct,
based on which we define the valuation v: v(xi) = 0 if Xi occurs as conjunct, and v(xi) = 1
if Xi occurs as conjunct. We can furthermore show that v satisfies each clause cj , 1 ≤ j ≤ m:
the proof used some sentence of the form Xi v ∀r.Cj or Xi v ∀r.Cj ; in the first case, we have
v(xi) = 1 by definition of v (Xi must be a conjunct of C), and xi ∈ cj by construction of Tϕ,
and in the latter, we have v(xi) = 0 by the definition of v and ¬xi ∈ cj by the construction of
Tϕ. It follows that v is a satisfying assignment of ϕ.
We have shown that ϕ is satisfiable iff Tϕ |= A v F has a tree proof of size at most
2n+4m+9, which means that SAT can be reduced toMTPexpunary(D). Consequently, MTPexpunary(D)
is NP-hard.
We can show the remaining upper bound in a similar way as before.
Theorem 19. MTPexpunary(D) is in NP.
Proof. We can use the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 10, but allow to guess
vertices of D(T , η) several times and additionally check that we obtain a tree proof.
Finally, in the next theorem we argue that soundness and completeness of the forgetting-
based approach (FBA) rely on soundness and completeness of the constituent components.
Theorem 21. Let FBA use a sound and complete reasoner to compute justifications and a
sound forgetting tool. Given a sentence η and a TBox T , FBA produces a proof P iff T |= η.
Proof. It is not hard to see that the hypergraph D = (V,E, `) constructed this way is indeed
a proof according to Definition 4. First, D is a derivation structure: it is grounded since every
vertex v ∈ V without an incoming edge is labeled with an sentence from J ⊆ T ; and it
is sound since for every edge (S, d) ∈ E, {`(s) | s ∈ S} is a justification for `(d). Second,
every (S, d) ∈ E is obtained from a pair Ti, Ti+1 from our generated sequence of TBoxes,
that is, {`(s) | s ∈ S} ⊆ Ti and `(d) ∈ Ti+1, which means that D is an acyclic derivation
structure. It follows that D is a proof according to Definition 4. Thus, by Lemma 23, FBA is
sound. Moreover, even if the forgetting process itself is not complete, FBA always generates a
proof.
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B Examples of Generated Proofs
We finally discuss a few more examples that illustrate the differences between the three proof
generators compared in Section 5. The images in Figures 12 and 20–22 were generated auto-
matically from our datasets. Recall that hyperedges are denoted by blue boxes labelled with
the type of inference rule (for Elk) or the forgotten symbol(s) (for FBA). Figures 20 and 21
depict two cases where the Elk proofs are arguably better than the ones generated by FBA,
while Figures 12 and 22 illustrate advantages of FBA. Note that we chose quite small proofs as
examples, because larger ones would not easily fit on these pages.
Figure 20: A proof generated by Elk (left) vs. one for the same entailment generated via FBA
(right; using either Lethe or Fame). Using the n-ary “Intersection Composition” rule, Elk
allows to formulate a cleaner proof, while the iterative forgetting approach requires separate
steps to eliminate each symbol.
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Figure 21: Again, Elk (top) allows to eliminate several symbols at the same time, while
the forgetting-based proofs (center: Lethe, bottom: Fame) are more complicated. Fame
makes extensive use of the expressivity of ALCOI because it needs to preserve all ALCOI-
consequences, which is a disadvantage in this case.
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Figure 22: Elk (left) makes many simple steps, which are collapsed by FBA (right) into
a simpler proof. Assuming basic knowledge about description logics, the latter is arguably
preferable.
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